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Identity Priming Consistently Affects Perceptual Fluency but Only Affects
Metamemory When Primes Are Obvious
Jonathan A. Susser, Andy Jin, and Neil W. Mulligan
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Perceptual fluency manipulations influence metamemory judgments, with more fluently perceived
information judged as more memorable. However, it is not always clear whether this influence is driven
by actual experienced processing fluency or by beliefs about memory. The current study used an
identity-priming paradigm—in which words are preceded by either matched (identical) or mismatched
primes—to examine the 2 influences. Participants named and made judgments of learning (JOLs) for
critical words and then completed a memory test. In Experiment 1, we briefly presented the primes and
found a priming effect on naming latencies but not on JOLs. In Experiment 2, we presented the primes
for longer durations and, again, found an effect on naming in addition to an effect on JOLs. A mediation
analysis revealed that naming latencies did not account for the prime–JOL relationship. This pattern of
results demonstrated a manipulation of perceptual fluency that influenced JOLs only when belief-based
information was readily available.
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Research in metamemory has uncovered numerous cues that
people use to make predictions about future memory, some diag-
nostic of actual memory performance and some not (Bjork, Dun-
losky, & Kornell, 2013; Koriat, 1997). In particular, the fluency of
processing information (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009) can guide
predictions, such that material processed in a more fluent manner
is often predicted to be better remembered on a later test (e.g.,
Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Besken & Mulligan, 2013,
2014; Matvey, Dunlosky, & Guttentag, 2001).
Perceptual fluency is one instantiation of processing fluency that
has received recent scrutiny. In an initial investigation of this cue,
Rhodes and Castel (2008) had participants study words presented
in large (48-point) or small (18-point) font, make judgments of
learning (JOLs; a 0–100 confidence rating) on each one, and then
take a recall test. Across six experiments, participants consistently
gave higher JOLs to the large than small items despite recall being
equivalent for the two. Under the assumption that the larger words
were easier to read, Rhodes and Castel concluded that ease of
perception informs JOLs. Furthermore, the finding that partici-
pants recalled large- and small-font words equally well demon-
strated that perceptual fluency acted as a metacognitive illusion.
Subsequent studies have used a variety of manipulations to provide
further and more direct support for the notion that manipulations of
perceptual ease might affect metamemory (e.g., Besken & Mulli-
gan, 2013, 2014; Rhodes & Castel, 2009; Yue, Castel, & Bjork,
2013).
In addition to understanding which cues impact metamemorial
judgments, researchers are also interested in how participants make
use of such cues. Specifically, the effect of a cue may stem from
experienced processing fluency driven by direct interaction with
materials or from a belief that people have about the effect of the
cue on memory (or perhaps a mix of both; e.g., Koriat, Bjork,
Sheffer, & Bar, 2004; Matvey et al., 2001; Mueller, Dunlosky,
Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014; Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013;
Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015). Importantly, despite claims that a cue
exerts its effect on JOLs through experienced fluency—and
fluency-based hypotheses propose this to be the case—only a few
studies have directly investigated the contributions of experiences
and beliefs to a JOL effect. The studies that have focused on this
issue with regard to perceptual fluency have produced mixed
results.
Mueller et al. (2014) used a variety of methods and analytic
techniques to assess the roles of fluency and beliefs in the font-size
effect on JOLs (see Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Mueller et al. as-
sessed processing fluency of large and small words through two
measures: lexical-decision latencies and self-paced study times.
The researchers found no differences across font size in either
fluency measure but did find the expected effect on JOLs. This
combination of results was taken as evidence that beliefs are the
locus of the font-size effect. However, because font size did not
influence processing fluency, this study does not provide decisive
evidence on the larger question of whether perceptual fluency, per
se, actually affects metamemory. Rather, it implies that font size,
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initially taken as a manipulation of perceptual fluency, did not
actually affect perceptual fluency.
Other studies have reported evidence consistent with an expe-
riential basis for perceptual fluency effects. Besken and Mulligan
(2014) had participants listen to and name aloud recordings of
study words presented intact or interspersed with brief silences.
Participants were faster at naming the intact words and provided
higher JOLs for them, despite recall being enhanced for the de-
graded words. Critically, the researchers correlated the difference
in naming latencies between intact and degraded words with the
difference in JOLs between the two conditions and found a neg-
ative correlation. This result indicates that the degree of slowing
produced by the interspersed silences (a measure of a change in
perceptual fluency) predicted the degree of reduction in JOLs,
suggesting that experience at least partially drove the JOLs. Ball,
Klein, and Brewer (2014) also argued that the experience of
perceptual fluency influences metamemory. These authors used
font-size and bolding manipulations of educationally relevant ma-
terials and found that smaller font—not larger—and bolded fonts
were associated with less study time (their measure of processing
fluency) and greater JOLs. Mediation analyses revealed that study
time either partially or fully mediated the effects of item type on
JOLs, suggesting that fluency experience accounted for at least
some of the JOL effects. However, the materials in this study
differed greatly from those in prior research, and the measure of
fluency did not isolate perception, per se, making strong conclu-
sions about the role of perceptual fluency unclear.
Prior research on this topic has, reasonably enough, used ma-
nipulations thought to affect perceptual fluency and examined their
effects on JOLs. Said differently, prior research has manipulated
(or tried to manipulate) perceptual experience to draw conclusions
about the extent to which experience or beliefs mediate effects in
this domain of metamemory. An alternative approach used in the
present experiments is to manipulate perceptual fluency (as in-
dexed by naming latencies) and, at the same time, alter the avail-
ability of people’s beliefs about the material. We think this might
provide a more direct way to assess the role of beliefs in purported
perceptual fluency effects in metamemory.
A standard way to assess a priori metacognitive beliefs is
through a questionnaire that provides participants with a descrip-
tion of an experiment and asks them to predict recall for various
conditions (e.g., Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell, Rhodes, Castel, &
Tauber, 2011; Mueller et al., 2014). An advantage of this meth-
odology is that participants do not experience any manipulations
and therefore cannot be influenced by this experienced-based
information. However, disadvantages of this technique are that
each participant provides few data points (e.g., one or two JOLs
each) and may generate beliefs only after being prompted by the
questionnaire (see Mueller et al., 2014). Furthermore, if a ques-
tionnaire study indicates that participants have an a priori belief
about the effect of a cue, this does not mean that direct experience
plays no role; experience still might contribute to JOLs even when
these beliefs exist.
Given the ambiguity in the prior research, the current study
extended work on the role of experiences and beliefs in perceptual
fluency manipulations. Using perceptual fluency allowed us to
approach the experience–belief issue from a novel perspective and
to design experimental situations that altered the nature of beliefs
while holding experienced fluency constant. Specifically, we bor-
rowed the identity-priming paradigm used by Jacoby and White-
house (1989) and others (e.g., Westerman, Lloyd, & Miller, 2002)
to investigate fluency effects at retrieval and adapted it for encod-
ing and metamemory. Participants named aloud and made JOLs
for study words primed with an identical prime or a mismatched
prime (i.e., a different word); the identical (matched) primes pro-
duced greater perceptual fluency of their target words (measured
here through naming latencies). Across two experiments we varied
the duration of the prime words, thereby altering their noticeability
and the scope for beliefs to contribute to the metamemorial judg-
ment. Prior research examining recognition phenomena has used a
similar strategy to assess how people attribute fluency in making
memory decisions (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Joordens & Mer-
ikle, 1992). In the realm of metamemory, some research has
studied the effects of priming (e.g., Narens, Jameson, & Lee,
1994), but this method has not been applied to the question of
perceptual-fluency effects or to the attempt to tease apart
experience- and belief-based influences.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Twenty-five undergraduates participated in ex-
change for course credit.
Materials and design. The critical study words were 36
medium-frequency, 5-letter words (30–70 per million; Kucera &
Francis, 1967). Four additional words were presented at the be-
ginning and end of the list as primacy and recency buffers, and six
more were used as practice and to calibrate the microphone voice
key (see Procedure). Twenty-eight additional prime words (22 for
the study list and six for practice) were selected from the same
pool. All words were presented in lowercase letters in the center of
a CRT monitor.
Prime type (match vs. mismatch) was manipulated within-
subject. Matched primes were identical to the critical study words
they preceded, whereas mismatched primes differed from the
critical study words. Items were pseudorandomly intermixed such
that no more than two trials from a condition were presented
consecutively. Two versions of the list were constructed, counter-
balancing words across prime type.
Procedure. The experiment had four phases: calibration, en-
coding, distraction, and recall. Prior to the start of the experiment,
participants were instructed that they would see individual study
words preceded by a row of number signs and that they should use
these signs as warning signals that a word was about to appear
(these instructions and the following design were adapted from
Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; see also Westerman et al., 2002). On
each trial of the calibration phase, participants saw a premask
(#####) for 250 ms, a mismatched prime word for 32 ms, a
postmask (#####) for 250 ms, a delay for 800 ms, and then a study
word for 4 s. Participants read each study word aloud into a
handheld microphone as quickly as possible and received feedback
about whether they had spoken loudly enough. There were six
calibration trials in all. The encoding trials followed the same
structure, except that primes were either matched or mismatched,
no feedback was given, and participants rated their confidence in
recalling each study word on the later test, from 0 (not confident at
all) to 100 (extremely confident).
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Following the encoding phase, participants completed 3 min of
arithmetic problems. Then, participants were given up to 5 min for
the recall test; they were asked to write down as many of the study
words as they could remember.
Results and Discussion
One participant did not speak loudly enough, resulting in a loss
of naming latencies. This participant was eliminated, leaving an
effective sample size of 24.
Median naming latency (in milliseconds) was computed for
each participant separately for the match and mismatch conditions.
A matched-samples t test conducted on median naming latencies1
demonstrated faster naming for the matched (M  793.02, SD 
172.75) than mismatched (M  828.00, SD  175.41) items,
t(23)  3.09, p  .005, d  0.63.
A matched-samples t test on participants’ JOLs (see Figure 1)
revealed equivalent JOLs for matched and mismatched items,
t(23)  0.44, p  .662. Likewise, another t test revealed no
differences in recall for matched (M  .23, SD  .09) and
mismatched (M  .19, SD  .10) items, t(23)  1.44, p  .164.
Resolution (the gamma correlation between JOLs and recall per-
formance) was significantly greater than 0 (G  .19, SE  .08),
t(23)  2.24, p  .035, d  0.46.
The effect of prime type on naming latencies demonstrated that
this manipulation influenced perceptual fluency. However, the
difference in perceptual fluency across study words was not used
as a cue for JOLs: Matched and mismatched words received
similar predictions. This pattern of results indicates that when
perceptual fluency is manipulated inconspicuously, the cue may
not inform predictions.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we found that rapid identity priming can
influence naming latencies, an objective measure of perceptual
fluency, without affecting JOLs. In Experiment 2, we presented the
primes for longer durations, making them easily identifiable and
making it obvious whether a study item was in the match or
mismatch condition. Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) and others
(e.g., Gellatly, Banton, & Woods, 1995; Joordens & Merikle,
1992) found that more salient primes changed the effect of per-
ceptual fluency on recognition memory due to changes in partic-
ipants’ beliefs about the basis of the fluency experience (i.e., a
change in attribution). We approached the present experiment in a
similar manner: Increasing the obviousness of the primes, and thus
the obviousness of the prime–study word relationship, should
provide a broader scope for beliefs to operate. In other words, in
Experiment 2 the relationship between the prime and the subse-
quent word was much more accessible to participants than in
Experiment 1. However, we again expected the identical primes to
produce facilitation on perceptual fluency itself (measured by
naming latencies), consistent with Experiment 1 (e.g., Burt, Kipps,
& Matthews, 2014).
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight undergraduates participated in ex-
change for course credit.
Materials, design, and procedure. Prior to the start of the
experiment, participants were instructed that each study word
would be preceded by another word for a brief duration and that
they should silently read this first word. Otherwise, the methods
were identical to those in Experiment 1, except that the prime word
was presented for 200 ms.
Results and Discussion
A matched-samples t test conducted on median naming laten-
cies.2 demonstrated faster naming for the matched (M  733.70,
SD 183.40) than mismatched (M 767.21, SD 184.08) items,
t(27)  3.07, p  .005, d  0.58.
A matched-samples t test on participants’ JOLs (see Figure 1)
revealed greater JOLs for matched than mismatched items, t(27)
4.74, p  .001, d  0.91. To further dissect the relationship
between prime type and JOLs, we ran a partial correlation analysis
to assess the mediating effect of experienced fluency (measured by
naming latencies; see Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder,
2003; Susser & Mulligan, 2015). Within-subject gamma correla-
tions (Nelson, 1984) between prime type (0  mismatched; 1 
matched) and JOLs were significantly greater than 0 (G  .33,
SE  .06), t(27)  5.62, p  .001, d  1.06. When controlling for
naming latencies, this relationship did not change (partial G .35,
SE  .06), t(27)  0.58, p  .568, and remained significantly
greater than 0, t(27)  5.57, p  .001, d  1.05. This result
indicates that no mediation took place and that experienced per-
ceptual fluency did not explain the relationship between prime
type and JOLs.
A matched-samples t test on recall performance revealed no
difference in memory for matched (M  .18, SD  .10) and
1 Some of the naming data (1.6%) was lost from trials on which the voice
key did not trip, resulting from a quieter-than-usual response from the
participant. This amount is comparable to that in prior research (e.g., Burt
& Heffernan, 2012; Prull, 2010).
2 As in Experiment 1, some of the naming data (2.9%) was lost from
trials on which the voice key did not trip, resulting from a quieter-than-
usual response from the participant.
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Figure 1. Mean judgments of learning (JOLs) in Experiments 1 (32 ms
prime duration) and 2 (200 ms prime duration). Error bars represent1 SE.
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659IDENTITY PRIMING AND METAMEMORY
mismatched (M .18, SD .10) words, t(27)0.16, p .878.
The resolution of JOLs was weak and only marginally greater than
0 (G  .13, SE  .07), t(27)  1.84, p  .077.
Consistent with Experiment 1, study words preceded by
matched primes were named faster than those preceded by mis-
matched primes. This effect validates the manipulation of percep-
tual fluency. However, unlike in Experiment 1, participants in
Experiment 2—who saw the primes for a longer duration—
gave higher JOLs for the matched than mismatched items. In
other words, when the primes were more identifiable and the
item conditions more obvious, participants incorporated the
information into metamemorial predictions. At first glance, this
pattern of results may seem supportive of a role for perceptual
fluency in metamemory: The matched words were named faster
and given higher JOLs. However, the results of Experiment 1
imply that this is not the case. In that experiment, matching
primes similarly facilitated perceptual fluency but produced no
effect on JOLs. Likewise, the results of the mediation analysis
imply that the effect of prime type on JOLs was not driven by
fluency. To shed further light on the role of prime duration, we
conducted a combined analysis using the data from Experiments
1 and 2.
Cross-Experiment Analysis
Naming latencies, JOLs, and recall were submitted to separate 2
(prime type: matched or mismatched)  2 (experiment: Experi-
ment 1 or Experiment 2) analyses of variance. For naming laten-
cies, the analysis produced a main effect of prime type, indicating
faster naming for matched than mismatched items, F(1, 50) 
18.88, MSE  1.61  103, p  .001, p2  0.27. The effect of
experiment was not significant, F(1, 50)  1.49, MSE  6.27 
104, p  .229, nor, critically, was the interaction (F1).
Regarding JOLs, a significant main effect of prime type, F(1,
50)  9.45, MSE  37.45, p  .003, p2  0.16, was qualified by
a significant interaction between prime type and experiment, F(1,
50)  13.57, MSE  37.45, p  .001, p2  0.21, as described
earlier. The main effect of experiment was not significant, F(1,
50)  1.60, MSE  358.64, p  .212.
Recall performance produced no significant effect of prime
type, F(1, 50)  1.08, MSE  0.01, p  .303; experiment, F(1,
50)  1.99, MSE  .01, p  .165; or interaction, F(1, 50)  1.53,
MSE  0.01, p  .222.
General Discussion
Recent research in metamemory has sought to understand the
contributions of experience-based and belief-based influences on
JOLs (e.g., Koriat et al., 2004; Mueller et al., 2014). Although
fluency-based hypotheses propose experience to be the root of JOL
effects, the potential role of beliefs in these effects—particularly in
the context of perceptual fluency—has not been thoroughly inves-
tigated.
The current study used an identity-priming design to assess how
experiences and beliefs may contribute to JOLs. Results from two
experiments—the sole difference between which was the presen-
tation duration of the prime word—revealed an effect on
metamemory only when primes and item conditions were obvious,
despite equivalent effects on naming latencies. Coupled with the
findings from a mediation analysis, this pattern suggests that the
divergent JOL results were driven not by perceptual fluency, per
se, but by increased knowledge of the prime words, a type of
belief. Further, the change in JOL patterns occurred in the absence
of any recall differences across experiments.
Our results are consistent with research using the Jacoby–
Whitehouse paradigm, which has found distinct patterns in recog-
nition responses when prime salience is manipulated (e.g., Gellatly
et al., 1995; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Joordens & Merikle,
1992), differences thought to be due to an attribution (belief)
process. We argue that the differences in prime duration across our
experiments resulted in changes in the obviousness of the primes
and item conditions, which altered participants’ ability to apply
their beliefs to their JOLs.
Given the evidence for this belief-based effect, we can speculate
about what form this belief takes. On the one hand, people could
have a belief about perceptual fluency and memory, in that they
believe that more fluently perceived information will be better
remembered. On the other hand, people could hold a belief about
item repetition: They may believe that repetition benefits memory.
The present data do not clarify the locus of the belief, and other
possibilities exist, so this will be an intriguing direction for future
studies.
To our knowledge, this is the first example of an objective
manipulation of perceptual fluency that affects JOLs solely
through beliefs (but see Mueller et al., 2013, for a similar finding
using an item-relatedness manipulation). Ball et al. (2014) found
that processing fluency only partially mediated the effect of bold-
ing on JOLs, suggesting beliefs played a role, but they did not
measure perceptual fluency directly, instead measuring study time.
Consequently, it is unclear whether their manipulations actually
impacted perceptual experience. Mueller et al. (2014) demon-
strated that font size exerted its effect on JOLs primarily through
a belief; however, it was shown that font size does not actually
influence perceptual fluency. In contrast, other manipulations
thought to influence perceptual fluency—such as letter transposi-
tion (Susser, Mulligan, & Besken, 2013) and inverted text (Sung-
khasettee, Friedman, & Castel, 2011)—have failed to affect JOLs.
Therefore, these studies demonstrate neither experience-based nor
belief-based effects.
Our results present a challenge to prior studies claiming effects
of perceptual fluency on metamemory. At face value, our findings
suggest that perceptual fluency effects on JOLs do not exist. That
is, when (assumed) perceptual fluency manipulations affect JOLs,
perhaps they do so only via beliefs and not via actual experience
(i.e., perceptual fluency itself). This proposal can accommodate
the results of prior studies that used perceptual manipulations and
found JOL effects but did not objectively measure perceptual
fluency (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009). At least one of these
manipulations has since been shown to have no effect on fluency
(see Mueller et al., 2014), raising doubts about contributions of
experience. Other studies used manipulations known to affect
perceptual fluency (or are reasonably supposed to do so) and found
JOL results in the direction predicted by the perceptual-fluency
hypothesis (e.g., Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Yue et al., 2013).
However, in these studies the perceptual manipulations were very
obvious (i.e., perceptual interference and blurred text). Therefore,
it is possible that participants either applied an a priori belief
about the manipulation or developed one in the context of the
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660 SUSSER, JIN, AND MULLIGAN
experiment. Such a belief, coupled with the ability to apply it to
the items (because it is apparent which items are in which
condition), may account for the pattern of metamemory judg-
ments.
Although many of the results in the literature can be accommo-
dated by the notion that apparent perceptual fluency effects are
actually mediated by beliefs, one of our studies resists this inter-
pretation. In this study, participants were presented with recorded
words varying in auditory clarity (Besken & Mulligan, 2014). The
researchers found a negative correlation between the difference in
naming latencies for intact and degraded words and the difference
in JOLs between the two conditions. In other words, the degree of
slowing produced by the degraded words predicted the degree of
reduction in JOLs, suggesting that actual perceptual experience
contributed to the effect on JOLs. Of course, it is also possible that
the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph (i.e., Besken &
Mulligan, 2013; Yue et al., 2013) might have produced similar
support for a role of perceptual fluency in JOLs if objective
measures of perceptual fluency had been used (and the correlations
assessed). Therefore, future research will have to take these issues
into account to determine whether there are other manipulations
that may produce actual perceptual fluency effects, as opposed to
belief-based effects, on memory predictions.
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